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Introduction
After the Second World War, German 
manufacturing moved from mass-produc-
tion to diversified quality production or DQP 
(STREECK; SORGE, 2018; STREECK, 1998). 
The medium-sized and large family-controlled 
firms, the so-called Mittlestand, led this trans-
formation. As Streeck (2009) reminds us, ma-
ny small and medium-sized firms are inter-
nationally competitive in the German econ-
omy, whose encouragement traces back to 
the 1950s with the ordo-liberalism at the or-
igin of the so-called Social Market Economy. 
The Mittelstand constituted the primary driv-
er of innovation in manufacturing. In 1972, 
the creation of the Federal Ministry for Re-
search and Technology (BMFT) aimed to sup-
port small and medium-sized firms, including 
the creation and growth of new firms. The ra-
tionale was that the search for new technolo-
gies could not rest on the private sector alone 
and thus, strong political support from the 
state was politically acceptable. 
* Universidade de Brasília (UNB), Programa de Pós Estudos Comparados sobre as Américas, Brasília, DF, 
Brasil. E-mail: moises@unb.br. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5187-1071.
** Universidade de Brasília (UNB), Brasília, DF, Brasil. Email: jackson.detoni@gmail.com. ORCID:  https://
orcid.org/0000-0002-9277-1069.
*** Universidade Cândido Mendes (UCAM), Programa de Pós-graduação em Sociologia, Niterói, RJ, Brasil.
Email: ajjbotelho@gmail.com. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6743-9155.
334 Rev. Pós Ciênc. Soc., São Luís, v.18, n.2, 333-354, mai/ago, 2021
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Ger-
many veered to a mTarket-oriented ap-
proach with a smaller role for the financial 
support of the state for R&D. Explicit and 
targeted industrial policies, in general, as-
sociated with protectionism, unfair com-
petition, and inefficiencies, started being 
banned from the policy repertoire in favor 
of policies to increase competitiveness. Dur-
ing this period, the country partially lost its 
innovative momentum compared to other 
industrialized countries, in contrast with its 
earlier expansion of R&D between 1960 and 
1979 (Ifo Institute of Research, 1997).
Nevertheless, Germany, after recovering 
from the 1980s and 1990s crisis, and par-
ticularly after the great crisis of 2008, has 
shored up innovation policies. It appears 
to heed the fact that deregulation and the 
creation of a conducive business environ-
ment as the only role of the state have grad-
ually lost support among policymakers and 
business itself, to a lesser extent. The feder-
al budget for research and development lept 
from nine billion euros to 15.8 billion. It is 
a rise of 75% (Bundesbericht Forschung und 
Innovation 2016). It is in part a result of 
the 2006 High-Tech Strategie. It is a broad 
problem-oriented strategy for different pro-
grams and initiatives being carried out at 
three levels; the national, the regional (Län-
der), and the international. 
The main issues addressed are the sus-
tainable economy, environment-friendly 
energy, efficient health services, smart mo-
bility, and innovative firms. It encourages 
networking between firms, universities, and 
research institutes, and supporting the Mit-
telstand are two guidelines from this en-
compassing innovation policy in Germany. 
A significant feature of the High-tech Strat-
egie is its focus on a knowledge-intensive 
economy and society.
Two underlying reasons in the rebooting 
strategy from Germany since 2006 were the 
rise of newly industrialised countries with 
rapid upgrading processes such as Chi-
na and other East Asian countries and the 
prospects of demographic changes with the 
diminishing supply of highly skilled labour 
force. To meet these challenges, the coun-
try needs to commit itself to increase in-
novation as the main driver in the global 
competition.
In its official document about indus-
trial policy’s role in developing a knowl-
edge-intensive industrial society, the Ger-
man Industrial Association (Bundesverband 
der Deutschen Industrie) claims such poli-
cy needs to emphasize research, vocational 
training technical progress in general. Ac-
cording to the National Industry Strategy 
2030, necessary action concerns enabling 
technologies such as digitalization and ar-
tificial intelligence. 
Although Germany has not actively pur-
sued an industrial policy, the state has on 
several occasions intervened in the econo-
my, either to support specific sectors for so-
cial and political reasons (e.g., coal min-
ing in old East Germany after re-unifica-
tion; renewable energy) and even compa-
nies (e.g., BMW rescue in the 1960s) or to 
promote promising high-tech areas. More-
over, as Zettelmeyer tellellingly states: 
Germany has a dense web of industrial pol-
icies. It engages in extensive public-private 
coordination and cooperation, in research, 
in vocational training and education, and 
through initiatives such as Industrie 4.0. Its 
Fraunhofer Institutes, “Europe’s largest ap-
plication-oriented research organization,” 
are widely admired as a model for public and 
private collaboration in funding, generating 
and disseminating applied research. German 
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companies receive public financial support 
from multiple sources, including R&D grants 
awarded by federal and state governments 
and lowcost SME credit and equity supplied 
by the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), 
the second-largest national promotional 
bank in the world (after the Chinese Devel-
opment Bank). Germany’s publicly support-
ed seed capital fund, the High-Tech Gründer-
fonds, claims to have successfully launched 
more than 500 high-tech companies since 
2005. (ZETTELMEYER, 2019, p. 4)
Recently, the global financial crisis of 
2008/2009 led to increasing debates about 
industrial policy in Germany and in the EU1. 
In 2014, for example, the Bündnis Zukunft 
der Industrie convened industrial and em-
ployer associations as well as trade unions 
around five working groups to discuss poli-
cy proposals in five areas: Acceptance – at-
tractive Industry; Investment-strong indus-
try; Future of work in industry and indus-
try-related services; Value creation struc-
tures of the future, and International com-
petitiveness of the German industry. An end 
point to these debates that appears signal a 
paradigm shift (BOFINGER, 2019) was the 
issuance in February 2019 of the Nationale 
Industriestrategie 2030 (by Economy Min-
ister Peter Altmaier), followed by the re-
vised version Industriestrategie 2030  at the 
end of November of the same year desig-
nating three industrial policy pillars: 1-Im-
prove national and international frame-
work conditions for the industry; 2-Acti-
vate innovation potential and strengthen-
ing key technologies, and 3-Protect Ger-
many’s technological sovereignty. Further-
more, Germany’s Industrie 4.0 plan to pro-
mote networked factories and the “internet 
of things,” through standard setting, pri-
vate-public coordination, digital infrastruc-
ture, and R&D grants
The main purpose of this article to ex-
amine the status of German innovation 
manufacturing in view of recent calls for 
rebooting of Germany’s industrial policy 
to prepare towards its transition to knowl-
edge-intensive manufacturing. It does show 
by presenting and analyzing, first, the re-
cent trajectory of innovation manufactur-
ing, and second, the challenges and insti-
tutional change around the Mittelstand. The 
article draws on data from the German in-
novation surveys and data on German ex-
ports, reports from the German government 
and consulting firms as well as qualitative 
data from indepth interviews. The analy-
sis includes descriptive statistics as well as 
qualitative assessments. 
The article is divided into two sections, 
following this introduction, and a section 
with final considerations. The first char-
acterizes Germany’s manufacturing prow-
ess and the recent trajectory of its industrial 
policy, with a focus on its innovation per-
formance, in comparison to other advanced 
industrial economies, and on firm level data 
on the development of innovation. The sec-
ond presents, first, the family-owened Ger-
man SMEs (Mittelstand) as a national in-
stitution and discusses its key role in the 
country’s innovation manufacturing. Next, 
it considers the key institutional arrange-
ment for industrial support, financial sys-
tem, and discusses its critical complemen-
tarity with the German Mittelstand. 
1. https://ged-project.de/globalization/industrial-policy-eu/. February 14, 2020 Daniela Arregui Coka, 
Markus Overdiek. The Future of European and German Industrial Policy – Challenges for the EU and Ger-
many.
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1. Manufacturing and Innovation in 
Germany 
Among the industrialised countries in 
the European Union and the OECD, Ger-
many stands out by the growing impor-
tance of manufacturing. Germany was the 
only major industrial country in which 
manufacturing as a share of value add-
ed increased (slightly) between 1995 and 
2016. The country’s share of manufactur-
ing in GDP currently at 23 percent - twice 
that of France or the United States – and 
in the European Union 14 percent. Germa-
ny’s National Industrial Strategy 2030 is-
sued in April 2019 aims to raise this share 
to 25 percent) and 20 percent, respectively 
(ZETTELMEYER, 2019)2. Since 1999, Ger-
man manufacturing trade balance (Figure 
1) has grown significantly. 
2. In 2017, manufacturing share of German value added was 22.9 percent.
Figure 1 - Trade balance in manufacturing
 Source: OECD STAN Indicators apud Hancké and Coulter, 2013
German manufacturing firms’ industri-
al system is widely known as Diversified 
Quality Production (DQP), a product strat-
egy which applies the techniques of volume 
production to high quality product lines 
(STREECK, 1997). It is a differentiation in-
stead of a cost-driven competitive strategy. 
The DQP system is supported by a wide and 
dense mesh of institutions promoting ‘stra-
tegic’ interaction between firms and oth-
er actors. This supports an innovation pro-
cess that allows for steady, ‘incremental’ 
improvements to product lines. Innovation 
mainly takes place inside the firm by coop-
erative workers with a high degree of tech-
nical skill and with considerable operation-
al autonomy and responsibility for specific 
tasks (HANCKÉ; COULTER, 2013).
A recent report by the Brookings Institu-
tion comparing manufacturing in the Uni-
ted States and Germany aptly summarizes 
the competitive advantages and socio-e-
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conomic benefits of Germany’s prowess in 
manufacturing: 
Germany offers an example of an advanced 
economy that has been able to sustain man-
ufacturing as a relevant source of employ-
ment, growth, and exports. Manufacturing in 
Germany accounts for 20 percent of employ-
ment, nearly twice the share as in the Unit-
ed States. Manufacturing generates 22 per-
cent of total German GDP and 82 percent of 
German goods exports. In stark contrast to 
the United States’ $667 billion manufactured 
goods trade deficit, Germany’s trade surplus 
in manufacturing is about $425 billion.
These strong labor market, growth, and trade 
outcomes reflect Germany’s ability to in-
fuse technology into its manufacturing sec-
tor to remain globally competitive.  
Medium and high-technology industries ac-
count for a larger share of the sector’s to-
tal output in Germany (58 percent) than in 
the United States (42 percent). Yet a cross-
national comparison reveals that Germany 
invests only marginally more in public R&D 
as a share of its economy; U.S. universities 
exhibit much greater scientific impact; and 
entrepreneurship (as measured by new firm 
creation) is actually lower in Germany.” (PA-
RILLA; TRUJILLO; BERUBE, 2015, p. 6)
 However, manufacturing exports only 
tell part of the story of German’s success-
ful adaptation to globalization. As Herri-
gel (2015, p. 133) demonstrates, the Ger-
man manufacturing production model has 
changed with globalization: 
German manufacturing MNCs are shifting 
from servicing global demand via exports to 
a strategy of “produce where you sell” FDI 
expansion in emerging global markets. This 
strategy is generating recursive dynamics 
that are transforming the demographic and 
role composition of German home country 
production locations. (p. 133).
The model was focused on exports in the 
high quality end of global markets through 
offers of sophisticated and/or specialized 
technological solutions and was based on 
commitments to skilled labor, cooperative 
labor relations, and institutional supports 
for training and technological research. 
According to OECD data, Germany’s R&D 
spending as a share of GDP has been ris-
ing since the mid-1990s and now exceeds 3 
percent, in line with Japan (3.2 percent) and 
the United States (2.8 percent). 
Südekum (2018) suggests that Germa-
ny’s recent manufacturing growth was due. 
First, China’s rise created more jobs in Ger-
many as it was capable of supplying inter-
mediate manufactures and capital goods 
necessary for China’s growth and, second, 
increase in German savings, which de-
pressed demand for services and contrib-
uted to a sharp rise in the current account 
surplus during the 2000s. As these factors 
are unlikely to continue in the future, a de-
cline in the German manufacturing share is 
expected, as it happened in other advanced 
economies.
German manufacturing firms’ R&D ex-
penditure is high, reaching in 2010 €46.9bn, 
about 86%percent of the private economy’s 
total R&D expenditure, according to the 
Federal Statistical Office (HANCKÉ; COUL-
TER, 2013). Moreover, German technology 
firms have succeeded in specialized niches 
using ‘platform’ technologies, such as busi-
ness software services (CASPAR; LEHRER, 
SOSKICE, 2009). 
Among the industrialised countries, Ger-
many stands out from its European neigh-
bours in the innovation rate when consid-
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ering the patent grants and R&D spending 
as a GDP share. As can be seen from Fig-
ure 2, Germany has had an increase in the 
share of GDP on R&D spending. It went up 
from 2.4% in 2005 to nearly 3% in 2016. 
The country is well above the United States 
and Denmark and well above the Nether-
lands and the United Kingdom. On the other 
hand, the countries standing above Germa-
ny (Sweden, South Korea, Israel, and Japan) 
in the R&D investments as the GDP share 
are those stronger in ICT. 
Figure 2 - R&D spending as share of GDP (%)
Source: OECDStat, 2018
When the number of granted patents is 
considered, Germany had more than the 
half of France’s granted patents and more 
than two thirds of the UK. As for the rate 
of growth, the number of granted patents 
in Germany rose by 50% between 2007 
and 2016 (Figure 3). The rate of growth 
was higher than the UK with a 40% in-
crease and slightly lower than France with 
a 55% increase. However, the number of 
granted patents cannot be seen as the sole 
and main indicator of innovativeness. It 
is worth to remind that the medium-sized 
firms play a relevant role in the German 
overall rate of innovation and these firms 
tend to concentrate on very incremental 
product and process innovation which is 
not necessarily related to obtaining patent 
grants. As it can be seen from Figure 3, 
China had by far the fastest growth in the 
number of patent grants, going from near-
ly 70 thousand in 2007 to 424.5 thousand 
in 2016. 
The US had the second largest growth, 
moving from 228 thousand in 2007 to 436 
thousand in 2016. In the interviews with 
German officials and representatives from 
business associations, a major concern to-
wards innovation was the small amount of 
start-up in comparison to other developed 
countries. For Start-up firms, patent grant 
is virtually an assumption for its very ex-
istence. Such firms are entirely oriented to 
one or few products and patenting is the 
most important mechanism to protect their 
intellectual property. 
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In this sense, it is worth perceiving the 
growing share from public R&D from 30% 
in 2006 to 33% in 2014 as well as the to-
tal increase from nearly 60 billion in 2006 
euros to more than 80 billion euros in 2014 
(Figure 4). 
Figure 3 - Number of Patent Grants between 2007 to 2016 
Figure 4 - Type of R&D investment in Germany
Source: World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 2018
Source: OECDStat, 2020
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Although most of the innovations come 
from new products or processes developed 
by the individual enterprises or enterprises 
group, there was a substantial increase in 
the innovation developed by the firm in co-
operation with other firms and institutions 
between 2006 and 2014. This cooperative 
development increased from around 25% in 
2006 to 40% in 2014 (Figure 6). Such an in-
crease can be associated with policies which 
encourage cooperation such ZIM (Zentrales 
Innovationsprogramm Mittelstand) from the 
Ministry of Economics. 
This program started operating in 2008 
and has three modalities. One is the funding 
of individual firms’ new product/process 
development project, so that the funding 
is for the individual firm research and de-
velopment (FuE-Einzelprojekte in Unterne-
hmen). The second modality refers to coop-
eration projects for two firms or one firm 
and a research organization (ZIM-Kooper-
ationsprojekte). The third modality encour-
ages the building of firm networks for re-
search and development with a minimum of 
six firms.   
This policy funds 25% of the firms` in-
vestment in R&D up to a cap of 3 million 
euros and until 2,000 employees. Between 
2008 and 2015, there were 12,369 R&D 
projects supported by ZIM (KAUFMANN et 
al., 2019). In 2015, the small firms, rang-
ing from 10 to 49 employees, accounted 
for 55.3% of the R&D projects, and medi-
um-sized firms (from 50 to 249 employees) 
got 23.4% of the total projects. Larger firms, 
ranging from 250 to 499 employees, had 
a share of only 0.9%. Between 2008 and 
2018, the share of small and medium-sized 
firms with funded R&D projects relatively 
stable (KAUFMANN et al., 2019). According 
to a survey carried out with the beneficia-
ry firms from ZIM, the most urgent thing to 
improve in the program is the percentage of 
costs funded. 
The most frequent learning effects from 
joint projects in cooperation with oth-
er firms or organizations were applied 
Figure 5 - Share of innovative firms by size between 2004 and 2016
Source: Community Innovation Survey for Germany (2006-2016)
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know-how and technological knowledge 
(KAUFMANN et al., 2019). Although the 
ZIM essentially supports incremental inno-
vation, 39% of the projects stand as applied 
research to put an idea into a new prod-
uct or service. The majority of the projects 
(57%) relate to applied research in develop-
ing prototypes, new processes, and techni-
cal services, being more incremental than 
creating new stuff. 
Figure 6 - Cooperation by firm size (%)
Source: Community Innovation Survey for Germany (2006-2016)
When the cooperation arrangements on 
innovation are seen by firm size, the medi-
um-sized firms had the largest growth rate 
going from 19% of the firms in 2004 to 29% 
in 2014. As it can be seen from Figure 7, 
firm size matters for cooperation on inno-
vation, so that 51.3% of firms with 250 or 
more employees have at least one type of 
cooperative arrangement. Surprisingly, the 
percentage of small firms with cooperation 
is not negligible with nearly 20% having co-
operative arrangement on innovation. 
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2. The Mittelstand: the cornerstone 
Germany’s manufacturing innovation
After World War II, the large German 
companies, due to their association with the 
Nazi regime, had been encouraged to sell 
out assets and become smaller. Ordoliber-
alism became the predominant economic 
ideology in Germany. The very concept of 
the social market economy stemmed from 
the idea that it was necessary to strength-
en SMEs to ensure a more efficient market 
economy. One of the tenets of Ordoliberal-
ism is to assure an efficient and productive 
economic order with a general level of wel-
fare, and this can only be achieved with a 
more regulated economy without hamper-
ing the flourishing of a competitive market 
economy (WÖRSDÖRFER, 2014). Ordolib-
eralism was virtually the ideology connect-
ing the economic thinking with the German 
welfare state. The modern German welfare 
state after World War II had much in com-
mon with the principles of Ordoliberalism.  
From the 1950s onwards, the social mar-
ket economy became firmly embedded in 
German society. Mittelstand became a cru-
cial driver of the postwar economy and a 
national institution differentiating German 
capitalism. In the 1950s, the institute of re-
search on Mittelstand in Bonn had been 
founded (Institut für Mittelstandsforsc-
hung).  Röpke, one of the thinkers of Ordo-
liberalism, pleaded for the fostering of the 
small and medium-sized firms as a strategy 
to democratize capital, decentralize power 
structures and strengthen the market econ-
omy (WÖRSDÖRFER, 2014). 
The fact Mittelstand became increas-
ingly interwoven with the German effort 
to structurally recover its economy con-
tributed to change it into a national insti-
tution. Also, Mittelstand is key to quali-
ty production (STREECK, 1997). Because 
Figure 7 - Cooperation arrangements on innovation activities by firm size
Source: Community Innovation Survey for Germany (2006-2016)
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the scale-based competition was not viable 
to the German economy anymore, the fo-
cus on differentiated and quality production 
fits well with the structure and capabilities 
from Mittelstand. The role played by Mit-
telstand in the German economy demand-
ed supportive institutions to strengthen the 
country’s competitiveness based on quali-
ty production. In this sense, technological 
development and innovation became a sine 
qua non condition to prosper in a context 
of rising wage levels, which could only be 
compensated by high productivity levels. It 
is what Streeck (1998) calls the beneficial 
constraint. The initial constraint on lower 
labour costs turned into a beneficial focus 
on innovation and differentiation. 
 As shown in Figure 8, the rate of inno-
vators in German Mittelstand is very stable 
between 2009 and 2014. The product inno-
vators accounted for 23.4 in 2014, and this 
percent was 23.8 in 2009. In process inno-
vators, there was virtually no change be-
tween 2009 with 15% and 2014 with 15.4%. 
It poses a challenge to increase the innova-
tion rate in these firms. Or does it mean that 
the innovation potential from these firms 
has run out of steam?  
Figure 8 - Share of product and process innovators in Mittelstand (%) (2007-2014) 
Source: KfW-Mittelstandspanel, 2017 
Whe compared  to large firms, the av-
erage turnover percent to invest in R&D is 
1.4% in Mittelstand and 4.9 for large firms 
in 2014. This gap was smaller in 1995 with 
3% for large firms and 2.7 for Mittelstand 
(ASTOR, 2016). Spending on innovation ac-
tivities also slightly dropped from 34 billion 
euros in 2008 to 32 billion in 2014 (AS-
TOR,2016).   
At the same time, there was an increase 
in the percentage of firms facing obstacles 
to innovate. Between 2006 and 2014, the 
percent of firms considering high risks and 
high costs to innovate went up from nearly 
25% to 40%. The third major obstacle is the 
shortage of skilled labour force with 33% in 
2014. In 2006, this obstacle accounted for 
15% (ASTOR, 2016). 
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Innovation activities show an unstab-
le trend (Table 1). The percentage of small 
and medium firms with innovation activity 
increased from 70% to 88% between 2004 
and 2008 and then, after the crisis, went 
down to 73%. As for the medium-sized fir-
ms, the share of firms with innovation acti-
vities went up from 78% in 2004 to 93% in 
2010 and then fell to 85% in 2014. 
 
Share of firms with 




 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Small 60% 57% 78% 77% 63.3% 62.9% 44.6%
Medium 74% 72% 84% 86% 74.3% 75.5% 62.1%
Large 89% 87% 95% 94% 92.2% 93.9% 79.5%
Table 1 – Share of firms with innovation activity by size
Source: Community Innovation Survey for Germany (2006-2016)
The strength of the Mittelstand is also 
revealed by Germany’s export performance. 
The most performing industries in the Ger-
man exports are those where the Mittels-
tand and  the so-called ‘hidden champions’ 
(highly specialized firms which are the best 
in their niches) stand out. Machinery and 
equipment export almost doubled between 
2000 and 2011 from less than 150 billion 
dollars to nearly 300 billion. A sharp incre-
ase is also present in the exports of electri-
cal machinery and apparatus. 
Figure 9 - German Exports in selected industries (US million dollars) from 2000 to 2017
Source: OECDStat, 2020. 
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Between 2004 and 2014, there has been 
an increase in the number of innovative fir-
ms receiving public funds to invest on in-
novation. It is worth noting that the higher 
growth took place in firms in the range be-
tween 50 and 249 employees. 31.5% of the-
se firms received public funding in 2014 
comparing to 17% in 2004. The range be-
tween 10 and 49 employees rose by 6.2% 
from 16% to 22.2%. On the other hand, fir-
ms with 250 employees or more had a very 
negligible increase from 33% to 34.1%. This 
result seems to be coherent with the larger 
emphasis on typical medium-sized firms 
from government programs. 
Figure 10 - Innovative firms that received public funding by firm size (number of employees)
Probably the biggest challenge for the 
innovativeness of Mittelstand comes from 
the Industry 4.0 (SAAM et al., 2016). It is al-
so where the state support to develop scien-
ce-based firms and IT start-ups is most ne-
eded. The combination of modern Informa-
tion and Communication Technologies wi-
th manufacturing requires competences 
and skills which lay beyond the domain of 
most Mittelstand firms. Industry 4.0  requi-
res the internet of things and the digital ne-
tworking of the production process. 
This is also supported by the results from 
Strobel and Kratzer (2017) in which the au-
thors identified that the lack of standards 
for knowledge management leads to a de-
cline of innovation potential. We argue that 
the transition to Industrie 4.0 demands mo-
re of knowledge management skills. The la-
ck of standards together with the demands 
for knowledge-intensive ICT can hamper 
the innovative potential from Mittelstand. 
Employment in high and medium-tech ma-
nufacturing, ICT share in the GDP and hi-
gh-tech exports are virtually stagnated over 
the last decade and the industrial policy 
should heed these early signals.  
Source: Community Innovation Survey for Germany (2006-2016)
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The smaller number of start-ups in Ger-
many comparing to other industrialised 
countries indicates a disadvantage in the 
German innovation system. At the same ti-
me, differently from the US and the UK, the 
creation of firms stemming from universi-
ties and the presence of academic entrepre-
neurs is weaker in Germany. Larger manu-
facturing firms are compensating this by 
supporting the founding of start-ups (SA-
AM et al., 2016). 
3. Financing the Mittelstand
Germany has five main types of finan-
cial institutions, and all of them allocate fi-
nancial resources to the credit of indus-
trial firms (to a lesser extent, the cooperati-
ve banks). These are private banks, regional 
banks (Landesbanken), Cooperative Banks 
(Genossenschaft), Saving Banks (Sparkas-
sen), and a development bank called Kredi-
tanstalt für Wiederaufbau. A unique featu-
re of the German banking system is the high 
competition levels between different types 
of banks and the relationship with loans to 
finance manufacturing firms. Despite the 
growth of the capital market in Germany, 
German firms are still very bank-oriented 
when raising financial assets (DEEG, 2010). 
It is especially true in the case of the so-cal-
led Mittelstand or family-owned business. 
Deeg (2010) reminds us that Small and Me-
dium-sized (SME) firms in Germany have 
had the highest level of bank loans as a sha-
re of company liabilities. However, this has 
changed over the last years, with a growing 
number of firms relying more on private 
equities than on bank loans (Figure 12). Al-
so, despite ongoing changes in large firms’ 
corporate governance with a more promi-
nent role for institutional investors and ca-
pital markets, there is substantial stability 
in bank borrowing to SMEs (DEEG, 2010).
Figure 11 - Share of knowledge-intensive employment in high and medium-high technology in manufactu-
ring and services and share from ICT industries in the German 
Source: OECD Productivity Statistics (database), February 2016
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The German banking system’s diversity 
is a crucial factor for the ‘patient capital,’ the 
type of capital based upon long-term perfor-
mance rather than the kind of capital with a 
higher likelihood of exit because it is motiva-
ted by short-term performance (DEEG; HAR-
DIE, 2016). Deeg and Hardie (2016) stress that 
patient capital is not only related to blockhol-
ders and ownership from relational banks 
but is related to a diversity of financial orga-
nizations. In this sense, it is argued that hi-
gher competition between different types of 
financial organizations with a mix of regio-
nal banks, savings banks, and a development 
bank contribute to the access from Mittels-
tand to patient capital without ownership in-
terlocking between banks and firms. 
After private equity as a significant 
source of funding for the Mittelstand, cre-
dit banks and government incentives are in 
the form of public money as in the ZIM pro-
gram and special loans coming from KfW. 
Within bank credit, cooperative and savin-
gs banks are particularly relevant for small 
firms (HUMMEL, 2011).  Schäfer and We-
rwatz (2004) also found out that the degree 
of novelty was not associated with a pro-
ject financed by private equity, and German 
banks do not rule out high-tech financing 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). 
As seen from Figure 12, banks and own ca-
pital account for the highest percentage of 
funding for investment projects from SMEs 
in industries with more R&D investments.
Figure 12 - Types of financial support to Mittelstand in R&D intensive industries (%) (2007-2015) 
Source: KfW-Mittelstandspanel, 2005-2019
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In his study on the financial resour-
ces needed to finance innovation projects, 
Hummel (2011) identified the need for ex-
ternal funding for projects above 50,000 
euros, especially for small firms. The capi-
tal need between 50,000 and 200,000 euros 
does not seem attractive to investors, and 
this is where the bank credit is most nee-
ded. However, financing innovation as an 
intrinsically uncertain and risky activity is 
not suitable for bank loans. The loan gua-
rantees are an obstacle to funding. This obs-
tacle is a gap in the innovation funding to 
Mittelstand. Moreover, this is where Gover-
nment money is most needed to fund inno-
vation projects. 
In a recent work on the relationship be-
tween finance and industrial policy, Cozzi 
and colleagues (2016) remark that financial 
sector regulation and industrial policy ha-
ve been discussed separately, and it should 
not be this way. However, the authors claim 
predictable and suitable finance for the in-
dustry is critical for the industrial policy’s 
success. Better access to finance for bu-
siness, particularly for SMEs, is a relevant 
component of a new industrial policy (COZ-
ZI et al., 2016). 
One may say the diversity of the German 
financial system and the Mittelstand cons-
titute an institutional complementarity for 
the German innovation system once they 
both contribute to a better performance of 
innovation in firms’ population. The Ger-
man financial system’s institutional featu-
res reinforce the efficiency of the Mittels-
tand (AMABLE; EKKEHARD; PALOMBA-
RINI, 2005; HÖPNER, 2005). On the other 
hand, this institutional complementari-
ty is limited when entrepreneurship perfor-
ms a more prominent role in the innovation 
landscape. From the perspective of many 
interviewees, this seems to be a substantial 
challenge of the German innovation system 
because public or private venture capital is 
required to encourage start-ups. 
There were other public programs aimed 
at reversing the lack of financial and cre-
dit sources for manufacturing firms. Since 
1997, for example, with the Neuer Market’s 
creation, a segment of the Frankfurt stock 
market, it has targeted fast-growing com-
panies. As a result, there was a substan-
tial expansion in this funding source. The 
reform of the pension system in 2001 also 
reinforced the flow of resources to the capi-
tal market. Credit unions have recently con-
tributed to supply credit demand. The coo-
perative network has more than a thousand 
associated banks, including banks opera-
ting in niches and free admission. 
The largest of these entities is the Federal 
Association of Popular Banks (BVR - Bun-
desverband der Deutschen Volksbanken um 
Raiffeisenbanken). The free adhesion model, 
the capillarity of the System, and the pro-
ximity to manufacturing in the governance 
model promote the necessary synergy. 
The massive public banks associated wi-
th the network of saving cooperatives ir-
rigate credit in the industrial network. In 
contrast to the North American model that 
dispersed the production control, the Ger-
man still relies on investment projects ne-
tworking firms and different types of banks, 
creating more long-term commitments be-
tween managers and workers (JACKSON, 
2005). Although the 2008 crisis impac-
ted the industry, the coordinated capita-
lism model still preserves the relationships 
between small and medium-sized compa-
nies, small and medium investors, and as-
sets through the patient capital flow. New 
forms of financing emerged after the closu-
re of the Neuer Market in 2003. Banks we-
re encouraged to invest and manage assets, 
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especially small businesses (HACKENTHAL; 
SCHMIDT; TYRELL, 2005).
Final Considerations: Germany’s responses 
to knowledge economy challenges  
As shown above, Germany’s manufactu-
ring innovation has worked well so far. Its 
production model institutional arrangement 
has again proved its resilience and adapta-
bility in the aftermath of the 2008 great re-
cession. Without disregard for the important 
role of multinational corporations in the 
country’s manufacturing innovation system, 
the innovative capabilities from Mittelstand 
and its complementarity with a diverse fi-
nancial system constitute an enduring insti-
tutional feature of German capitalism. 
In the end, the German latest controver-
sial industrial policy statement, National In-
dustrial Strategy 2030, appears to be voided 
by the manufacturing innovation perfor-
mance of the existing traditional bottom-up 
industrial regime diverse policies (Various, 
2019). The National Industrial Strategy 
2030 has been highly criticized for its lof-
ty goals, weak assumptions, poor diagnos-
tic, and misguided orientations (BOFINGER, 
2019; ZETTELMEYER, 2019). Notwithstan-
ding such criticisms, it is worth reminding 
that this initiative has more to do with geo-
economic disputes than innovation. Its ra-
tionale is to protect German firms, espe-
cially Mittelstand, from hostile takeovers by 
foreign companies, mainly Chinese. It re-
flects this new geopolitical situation with 
less multilateralism and more decisive roles 
for the national states.   
However, the model faces new challen-
ges from two transformations in the global 
manufacturing landscape. One is the conti-
nuous upgrading from latecomers such as 
China and other East Asian nations, mo-
ving rapidly in the global value chain. Mo-
reover, more recently, the ambitious Made 
in China 2025 strategy (announced on May 
19, 2015), an industrial policy plan that se-
eks to gradually replace foreign with Chi-
nese technology in all high-tech industries 
(KUO; SHYU; DING, 2019). The Chinese me-
nace is one of the fundamental assumptions 
behind the industrial policy goals and ins-
truments of the National Industrial Strate-
gy 2030 (ZETTELMEYER, 2019; BARKIN, 
2020). The second transformation has to do 
with the so-called growing digitalization 
needs of manufacturing. The former points 
out that German Mittelstand manufacturing 
will need to continue investing more and 
more in innovation. 
Both transformations are interdependent 
because Germany’s Industry 4.0 contributes 
to maintaining the new competitors’ steps 
(SCHROEDER, 2019). 
Nevertheless, Germany’s share of ICT in-
vestment lags behind other competitive and 
more knowledge-intensive economies su-
ch as the USA, Japan, Sweden, and the Ne-
therlands. The German share stood at 1.72% 
of the GDP compared to 3.43% in Sweden, 
3.40% in Japan, 3.28% in the Netherlands, 
and 3.15% in the USA (OECD, 2016).
  Thelen (2019, p. 311) seminal compara-
tive political economy analysis of pathwa-
ys toward a knowledge economy in Ger-
many, the Netherlands, and Sweden, con-
cludes about Germany: “The German ca-
se stands out for the remarkable continui-
ty in the composition of economic activity, 
even as digital technologies are revolutio-
nizing traditional products and production 
processes. In this case, a powerful and resi-
lient cross-class coalition in manufacturing, 
supported and reinforced by state policy, is 
presiding over the transition to the knowle-
dge economy.” 
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However, Thelen (2019, p. 312) noti-
ces several possible trajectories of chan-
ge toward a knowledge economy transition 
depend on the political dynamics and coali-
tions. She remarks that “each is vulnerable 
to somewhat different pathologies and as-
sociated with different distributional outco-
mes.” She suggests that Germany’s success-
ful manufacturing exports continued to fo-
cus on traditional sectors like automobiles, 
leaving producers vulnerable to ever gri-
ping cost pressures. However, according to 
Puls and Fritsch (2020), between 2008 and 
2018, the German automotive industry ex-
perienced a golden age. It reached record 
sales, mainly driven by the healthy grow-
th of the Chinese market. The sector in-
creased its value-added in Germany, out-
growing all other manufacturing segments, 
further amplifying its economic importance 
in the country during this period. Moreover, 
it increased its contribution to innovation 
as 47.5 percent of all patent applications of 
legal persons in Germany were from the au-
tomotive industry.
Still, dark clouds are gathering in the 
future. From 2019, the global automotive 
market began to shrink, and the drive train 
technology began to shift towards electrifi-
cation, representing a significant challenge 
to small and medium-sized suppliers. Then 
in the spring of 2020, the Corona-Pandemic 
hit it with gale winds: global supply chains 
were interrupted, most automotive produc-
tion halted, and close to 60 percent of the 
German industry’s total employment put on 
short-time work (PULS and FRITSCH, 2020). 
However, it appears that the German mo-
del continues to respond well to the inno-
vation challenge. Results of a study analy-
zing the latest trends in vehicle-related pa-
tenting activity by German manufacturers, 
suppliers, and service providers reveal that, 
first, German vehicle manufacturing accou-
nts for a 40 percent share of overall German 
patent applications (by far the most innova-
tive sector); second just 30 percent of vehi-
cle-related patent applications are in the 
conventional power train (combustion en-
gine, power transmission, exhaust system, 
etc.) whereas 70 percent share is in future 
new technologies segments such as vehicle 
electrics and electronics, interior and exte-
rior, chassis, tires, brakes, locks, etc.; third, 
German automotive firms lead in digitiza-
tion, with a 43 percent share of total en-
tries in the IPC subclass “Electric Digital Da-
ta Processing”, and for more than one in 
six entries in “Additive Manufacturing” (for 
example, in  vehicle-related digitization te-
chnology are autonomous driving, additive 
manufacturing of light constructional com-
ponents, and driver assistance systems); and 
fourth, suppliers are responsible for the co-
re innovations in German vehicle manufac-
turing with two thirds of vehicle-related pa-
tent applications, mainly system suppliers 
like Bosch, Brose, Continental, Schaeffler, 
and ZF (KOPPEL; PULS; RÖBEN, 2018). 
Innovative manufacturing in Germany’s 
this transition to a knowledge-intensive 
economy calls for more than steady and ef-
ficient incremental innovation. It requires 
increased science-based outputs supported 
by activities and practices efforts, partially 
underway, with the High-Tech Strategie 
mechanisms and all the ongoing and plan-
ned initiatives concerning the transition to 
related to the Industry 4.0 framework, su-
ch as the encouragement of entrepreneur-
ship with start-ups to assist the Mittelstan-
dcompanies to meet the digitalization and 
overcome research-driven global compe-
tition, particularly from China. Germany’s 
conundrum is to what extent such changes 
will also require changing the institutions 
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supporting its hugely successful innova-
tion manufacturing model centered on DQP. 
Moreover, more critically, what the outco-
me of these changes will be. As institutional 
changes may affect the country’s unique, 
historically successful institutional com-
plementarities, there is always the risk of 
throwing the baby out with the bathwater. 
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ABSTRACT
German manufacturing firms’ industrial 
system is widely known as Diversified 
Quality Production, a product strategy 
which applies the techniques of volume 
production to high quality product lines 
(STREECK, 1997). It is a differentiation 
instead of a cost-driven competitive stra-
tegy. The DQP system is supported by a 
wide and dense mesh of institutions pro-
moting ‘strategic’ interaction between fir-
ms and other actors. However, the transi-
tion to Industrie 4.0 demands knowledge-
-intensive ICT which can hamper the in-
novative potential from Mittelstand. Em-
ployment in high and medium-tech manu-
facturing, ICT share in the GDP and high-
-tech exports are virtually stagnated over 
the last decade and the industrial policy 
should heed these early signals. The co-
nundrum faced by Germany is to what ex-
tent changes in manufacturing will also 
require changing the institutions which 
supported its successful innovation manu-
facturing model centred on Diversified 
Quality Production.
KEYWORD




O sucesso das empresas médias alemãs é 
amplamente conhecido como Produção 
com Qualidade Diversificada (PQD), uma 
estratégia de produto que aplica as técni-
cas de produção em escala às linhas de 
produtos de alta qualidade (STREECK, 
1997). A ênfase é na diferenciação ao in-
vés de uma estratégia competitiva baseada 
em custos. A PQD é apoiada por rede de 
instituições que promovem a interação 
“estratégica” entre empresas e outros ato-
res. No entanto, a transição para a Indús-
tria 4.0 exige um conhecimento intensivo 
de TIC que pode dificultar o potencial ino-
vador da Mittelstand. O emprego na ma-
nufatura de alta e média tecnologia, a par-
ticipação das TIC no PIB e as exportações 
de alta tecnologia estão estagnadas na úl-
tima década e a política industrial deve 
estar atenta a estes sinais. Até que ponto 
as mudanças na manufatura na Alemanha 
também exigirão mudanças nas institui-
ções que apoiaram seu modelo inovador 
bem sucedido da PQD.
PALAVRAS-CHAVES
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